As Quine (1956) observed, the following sentence has a reading which, if true, would be of special interest to the authorities:

  • (1) Ralph believes that someone is a spy.

This is the reading where the quantifier is naturally understood as taking wide scope relative to the attitude verb and as binding a variable within the scope of the attitude verb. This essay is interested in addressing the question what the semantic analysis of this kind of reading should look like from a Fregean perspective—a perspective according to which attitude states are generally relations to structured Fregean thoughts composed of senses. The Fregean view faces a challenge of compositionality here. This essay describes the challenge and offers a response on the Fregean's behalf.

Frege, senses, quantification, variable binding, attitude verbs, de re attitudes, de se attitudes
© 2015 by Cornell University
2015
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