But herein lies the strength of Elliott's narrative. Rather than offering tales of adventure against the backdrop of exotic and ever-changing peoples and places, Elliott stayed long enough to develop an understanding of the community around him. While he naturally tended to live inside the Anglo-American cocoon in and around Santa Fe, he was quite observant and able to convey the atmosphere of the territorial capital as the fate of the entire region was being decided on faraway battlefields. An eerie calmness punctuated by rumors and bursts of apprehension was the setting in which Anglo-Americans and *nuevomexicanos* tried to come to terms with one another. Elliott's letters are somewhat spotty for the early phase of the military occupation of New Mexico. Indeed, in this section the editors are forced to interject extracts from Elliott's memoir published decades later to fill the gap. But Elliott is at his journalistic best in the months following the takeover as he describes theater performances, courtship rituals, food and beverages, secret societies, and the eccentricities of some of New Mexico's leading characters, including the famed Gertrudis Barceló, gambling queen extraordinaire. With an eloquent style peppered with Shakespeare quotes, the Missouri volunteer also revealed some moments of intense introspection and chronicled the gradual transformation of the army of occupation as the months of inactivity multiplied the gambling "hells" and undermined discipline, rendering it dangerously ineffective. The last pages of the book contain sketches of the campaign that Elliott wrote after his return to St. Louis in July of 1847. While less valuable as testimonial evidence, the sketches nevertheless show the richness of wartime lore and folklore. Elliott's letters are much enhanced by the editors' informative and sometimes extensive endnotes that place Elliott's assertions in context and provide relevant biographical data. The book is well illustrated and constitutes a most welcome addition to the growing body of primary sources pertaining to the Mexican War and to New Mexico's history in the first half of the nineteenth century.

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*Nationalsozialismus in Lateinamerika: die Auslandsorganisation der NSDAP in Argentinien, Brasilien, Chile und Mexiko, 1931–1945*. By JÜRGEN MÜLLER. Historamerican, vol. 3. Stuttgart: Verlag Hans-Dieter Heinz, Akademischer Verlag Stuttgart, 1997. Illustrations. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. 567 pp. Cloth.

Prodigious archival research in Latin America and Germany provides the underpinnings for this meticulous study of the attempt by the Auslandsorganisation (Foreign Organization, hereafter AO) of the Nazi party to gain a foothold in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico. Much new information forms the solid substratum upon which this impressive monograph is based.

In this richly detailed narrative, Müller traces out the development of the AO from its inception in Hamburg in 1930 to the end of the Third Reich. He provides us with a clear picture of the AO and the role played by Adolf Hitler and his paladins, notably, Rudolf Hess, Josef Goebbels, Otto Strasser, and Heinrich Himmler. The careers of

Hans Nieland and Ernst Bohle, both of whom were instrumental in the development of the AO, are covered in this comprehensive work.

Through the use of extraordinary archival research, Müller makes inroads into the cliché-like picture of the Third Reich usually presented. For example, he makes a foray into the difficult terrain of the commonly accepted theory of polycratic rule in Nazi Germany. According to this theory, there existed a variety of structures and processes, some parallel and others in contradistinction to each other. Müller is able to trace the Nazi party's interest in Latin America directly to Hitler. Action by his minions, such as Rudolf Hess, had to be cleared through him.

Müller's intensive use of archives in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico provides many fresh insights into the organizational attempts of the Nazi party in these countries. His penetrating analysis and cogent arguments supersede previous work on the subject. The story Müller relates is a complicated one that contains many threads. However, he is able to weave them together in a comprehensive narrative. The goal of the AO in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico was to shape resident Germans in the Nazi mold and to entice local inhabitants into the Nazi party. Its success was limited. For example, of the 90,000 Germans living in Brazil, only 2,990 (3%) joined the party.

Throughout the book Müller provides valuable statistical information on members of the Nazi party as well as of various organizations such as the Hitler Jugend and the Frauenschaft. The majority of those who joined the Nazis were merchants between 31 and 50 years of age. The success of recruitment among Argentinian, Brazilian, Chilean, and Mexican merchants probably reflects the strong economic ties between these countries and Germany.

The Nazi party met with limited success despite well-organized and well-financed propaganda campaigns through the radio; newspapers; leaflets; and meetings with all the trappings, speeches, and paraphernalia associated with Nazi rallies. Only in Brazil was the party able to penetrate the government and the military. Its lack of success was due to its failure to take into consideration differences in culture, life style, and politics. During the period under study, there were 1.5 million Germans living in Latin America. They lived in German enclaves—speaking German, attending German schools, going to German churches, and participating in German clubs and social organizations. Their allegiance was to the fatherland. Müller's findings are significant because they prove that National Socialism was not exportable—at least not to Latin America. Only a small percentage of Germans in Latin America had any interest in Nazism with its anti-Communist, anti-Semitic, pro-Aryan propaganda. The people in Latin America, including the Germans, quickly perceived the revolutionary nature of National Socialism, with its philosophy based on race, and wanted nothing to do with it.

What role did Latin America play in Hitler's *weltanschauung* (worldview)? According to Müller, Hitler's interest in Latin America was purely economic. He did not want to secure territory there. He wanted to find his *lebensraum* (living space) in Eastern Europe and his *wirtschaftsraum* (economic space) in Latin America and the United States.

Müller is an superb archival researcher and has combed through previously unex-

plored collections to make significant contributions to our understanding of Nazi activities in Latin America. His findings are substantiated by copious documentation and subjected to riveting analysis. A book as complex as this, which contains much new empirical detail that expands our knowledge of German–Latin American relations in the Nazi period, should have had an index.

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*Zona rebelde: la diplomacia española ante la revolución cubana (1957–1960).* By MANUEL DE PAZ-SÁNCHEZ. Prologue by JOSEP FONTANA. Taller de Historia. Tenerife: Centro de la Cultura Popular Canaria, 1997. Appendix. Notes. Bibliography. Index. 401 pp. Paper.

Anyone can have a bad day. On January 20, 1960, the Spanish ambassador to Cuba certainly did. That evening Fidel Castro spoke at length on national radio and television about counterrevolutionary attempts against his government. He read a recently captured letter that alleged that the Spanish embassy was helping to arrange transit out of Cuba for many Roman Catholics seeking political asylum and exile. The letter also noted that its author belonged to a counterrevolutionary group, with ties to Catholic clerics, that was contemplating possible acts of violence against the Cuban government.

Juan Pablo de Lojendio e Irure, marqués de Vellisca, Spain's ambassador to Cuba, was sick in bed, watching television. Furious at Castro, Lojendio summoned his press attaché and rushed to the television station where, on stage and on camera, he introduced himself as Spain's ambassador and asked for "rectification of the calumnies that had been broadcast" (p. 304). Pandemonium broke out. On January 23, Lojendio left Cuba at the request of its government.

This book is an account of the Cuban revolutionary process from 1957 through 1960 as reported principally by Ambassador Lojendio to his government. Lojendio's dispatches were professional, analytical, perceptive, and eloquently written. His dumb, undiplomatic outburst on that fateful evening was uncharacteristic. Indeed, considering that he was an ambassador of dictator Francisco Franco's Spanish government, Lojendio had been remarkably helpful to anti-Batista revolutionaries in 1957–58, providing asylum and facilitating safe-conduct out of the country. In most of these cases, Lojendio had responded to requests from Catholic clerics.

In order to assess the Cuban Revolution's wider impact, Paz-Sánchez also makes use of dispatches from Spanish ambassadors posted to other Latin American countries. Most interesting is the extensive reporting about Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo's byzantine and provocative policy toward Cuba.

*Zona rebelde* presents little else of interest to scholars, however. The story that it tells is already very well known; there are no breakthroughs in empirical research. The author makes very little use of any other primary or secondary materials about Spain or Cuba. His account of the Cuban revolutionary process is, therefore, idiosyncratic and