The Foreign Office established a distinction between political and economic aims in the Caribbean. Though insistent upon an economic open door and equal protection for financial and commercial interests, British policymakers conceded political dominion to the United States and curried American favor. When such goals on occasion conflicted, Britain usually chose to preserve the special relationship with Washington, although President Taft's "dollar diplomacy" prompted a spirited defense of concrete interests. Professor Kneer understands the importance of economics but employs a non-Marxian model of explanation. The Foreign Office was something other than "the executive committee" of the capitalist classes. Still, Kneer acknowledges that a relatively small economic stake in the Caribbean facilitated a policy of political accommodation.

A volume such as this, composed largely of disparate, loosely connected episodes, required a high degree of conceptual integration. Though Kneer's line of argument on the whole is persuasive, his analysis isolates the Caribbean question from other, important issues. A fuller exploration of imperial relationships, the role of the Caribbean in them and the rivalry with Germany could have clarified why leaders in the Foreign Office so ardently desired to maintain an entente with the United States. Still, Kneer conveys a precise understanding of particular issues. His work will benefit specialists.

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The United States and Chile: Imperialism and the Overthrow of the Allende Government. By JAMES PETRAS and MORRIS MORLEY. New York, 1975. The Monthly Review Press. Tables. Appendix. Notes. Pp. xvii, 217. Cloth. $10.95.

In this book James Petras and Morris Morley attempt to describe relationships between the North American "imperial state" and multinational corporations which resulted in the downfall of the Chilean government in 1973. To describe such relationships without adequately defining the "imperial state" is difficult, but this does not dissuade them from the attempt. Lack of precise definition, however, severely limits the success of their argument.

"In today's world," they assert, "without the imperial state the multinationals stand as impotent giants" (p. viii). The authors would be well-advised to heed the words of Sancho Panza: "Pray look better, sir[s]; those things yonder are no giants but windmills. . . ." Like Don

Quixote's tilting, this book is based on illusion. Certainly policies of the United States government and certain corporations contributed to the failure of the Allende regime, but there is serious doubt that a direct causal relationship existed which led to the *golpe* of 1973.

In *Reflections on the Causes of Human Misery and upon Certain Proposals to Eliminate Them* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), Barrington Moore, Jr. chided students of the relationships between American foreign policy and business interests for, among other tendencies, "a powerful element of exaggeration" (pp. 115–117). By strictly limiting their discussion to the impact of U.S. foreign policy and actions of giant corporations on Allende's administration the authors have indeed succumbed to just such a "powerful element of exaggeration." Moreover, they practice a kind of intellectual and ideological imperialism by denying the importance of Chilean internal dynamics heavily responsible for the tragedy of 1973. This is like baldly stating that Standard Oil and Royal Dutch Shell caused the Chaco war by themselves or that the Spanish Civil War was merely a contest between international communism and fascism, which is indeed akin to mistaking windmills for giants. One gets the impression of an extended, conspiratorial conference call involving all business and government leaders in this country concerned with the Chilean situation. These are hard sell tactics based on an inexplicable ignorance of Chilean historical and socio-political development.

The value of the book lies in questions raised (but not satisfactorily answered). Just who is in the best position to determine the domestic and international policies of developing countries: sovereign states or multinational corporations? Is the minimizing of the role of the United States in Chilean affairs between 1970 and 1973 the same as the denial of any role at all? (In this book there seems to be a confusion between the two.) If the United States' role in Chilean affairs was as pervasive prior to 1970, as portrayed herein, why was the Allende regime permitted to exist as long as it did? Did a United States role, whatever its nature, perhaps prolong the Allende regime? Finally, what specifically is "evidence" of direct involvement of the United States in the overthrow of potentially unfriendly Latin American regimes? Much work remains to be done by scholars representing all possible points of view before adequate answers are forthcoming to questions like these.

This book might have been titled *The Nixon Administration and Chile*, for much of the evidence points to a poorly conceived response to Allende, UP and everything they stood for, more typical of the

Nixon years than of admittedly hardline policies directed towards some other Latin American regimes. Certainly Secretary of State William Rodgers' declaration that "the Nixon administration was a 'business administration' in favor of business and its mission was to protect business," (p. 89), is evidence of a less than subtle, sophisticated approach to U.S.-Chilean relations, 1970–1973. But it is not evidence of any direct causal relationship.

The book is extensively documented; nearly a quarter of its 217 pages consists of appendix and notes, but an overwhelming amount of documentation comes from English-language newspapers and published secondary sources. Extensive, selective use of the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* stories is no substitute for scrutiny of available Chilean materials.

In sum, this is a one-sided version of a tragic episode. It does not offer any new interpretations, nor is it convincing in its attempt to blame the United States for Allende's downfall.

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Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and Beyond. Edited by RONALD H. CHILCOTE and JOEL C. EDELSTEIN. Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1974. Schenckman Publishing Company. Maps. Tables. Figures. Glossary. Bibliography. Pp. xii, 781. Cloth.

This book represents the first survey of Latin American history written from the perspective of dependency theory. Five political scientists, five sociologists, and one historian have contributed to this hefty tome, which treats six countries with much more depth and scope than the average textbook. Guatemala, Mexico, and Argentina have been chosen as examples of pre-1960 conservative Latin American society, while Brazil, Chile, and Cuba represented new directions within the region before September 1973.

The editors contend that dependency is more than a theory, but a "defining characteristic" of the Third World. Foreign capitalist penetration is the principal cause of underdevelopment in Latin America. Only through its complete elimination can these countries independently develop new internal structures and regularize their relations with industrialized nations. Neither the Cuban nor the Chilean revolution is singled as the only way to break these dependent relationships, but the editors foresee the inevitable demise of capitalism and the eventual creation of a classless, egalitarian socialist society.