

lack of any index and failure to carry much of the data beyond 1968 (the period of the author's field research in Brazil). In most respects this data would strengthen the author's argument and accentuate trends which he has discerned. For example, even 1972 or 1973 figures on distribution of Brazilian diplomatic personnel by region show a continuation of the tendencies visible in Table 4 (p. 101). Given the tremendous expansion of Brazil's foreign trade (exports in 1974 were fully double those of 1972) in recent years, the cut-off date of 1967 or 1968 for a very substantial proportion of his time series is to be regretted. Yet to say that a valuable book could have been even more valuable should not deter any potential readers, unless they are seeking a convenient source of current facts and figures rather than a comprehensive and balanced treatment of an increasingly important facet of Brazil's foreign policy.

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*Argentina and the Failure of Democracy: Conflict among Political Elites, 1904-1955.* By PETER H. SMITH. Madison, 1974. The University of Wisconsin Press. Tables. Figures. Graphs. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 215. Cloth. \$12.50.

With this volume Peter Smith demonstrates more clearly than ever that he has crossed the boundary that separates traditional history from the other social sciences. "Part history, part methodology, part reference work" to quote its author, this book is directed to a variety of audiences in various disciplines and were it not for its indifference to model building could well have been produced by a political scientist or a sociologist. This being the case the non-quantitatively-oriented reader should be warned that methodological discussions and tabular presentations take up almost half the space.

For those not intimidated by the statistical apparatus, and there is little reason to be so, Smith presents a clear, coherent and logical explanation for the breakdown of Argentine democracy after 1930 and the emergence of corporate authoritarianism under Perón. His principal thesis is that the Argentine constitutional system broke down not because of overwhelming pressures placed upon it by social and economic change but because "it proved to be incapable of responding to demands which were intrinsically manageable." The failure in short was political.

To explain the reasons behind this failure Smith focuses on the

political elites or rather that part whose political behavior is quantifiable, namely the men who served in the Chamber of Deputies from 1905 to 1955. The core of this study is thus a statistical inquiry into the background and status of the 1,571 deputies who served in that half century and into their voting behavior as reflected in the 1,712 roll calls that took place. Using the techniques of roll-call analysis as developed by political scientists, the author seeks to answer such questions as: What issues did deputies fight about? How did these issues change over time? What factors influenced their positions? What kinds of intra-party and inter-party alignments were formed? His larger concerns, however, are with correlating the conclusions derived about the deputies' political behavior with the succession of crises that accompanied the transformation of the political system.

Specialists in quantification procedures will have to judge the adequacy and reliability of Smith's statistical manipulations. This reviewer is not qualified to do so, but he must admit to some puzzlement about their significance. For example a major statistical finding of the author is that party conflict rather than other factors was the most important consideration underlying voting divisions in the Chamber, and that party conflict intensified just before the military coups of 1930, 1943, and 1955. The author solemnly concludes from this: "When partisan conflict intensifies, military intervention follows" (p. 62). Yet the very party voting index he relies on to support the above proposition reveals an intensification of party conflict in 1937 that was *not* followed by military intervention. Moreover, since the author has told us earlier that no roll calls were taken in the 1955 session that preceded Perón's ouster, it is not clear what the index is measuring in that year.

This in turn raises the question of the adequacy of Chamber of Deputies roll-call analysis for an understanding of Argentine politics. Although the author in the introduction makes a case for the Chamber's significance as a microcosm of the national political community, one may question how accurately it reflected the pressures of competing groups. After all Argentina has had a presidentialist form of government and in the last analysis the locus of decision making was not in the Chamber. But even granting that the Chamber reflected national divisions over key issues, were these divisions necessarily translated into roll-call votes? The absence, as noted above, of any roll-call votes during the tempestuous period that preceded Perón's fall suggests the limitations of this kind of evidence for understanding any specific crisis.

The author's continuing concern with explaining his methodological decisions extends to the footnotes as well as the text and appendices. Perhaps for this reason he omits the kind of documentation one normally finds in narrative histories. Here and there, however, one would like to know the source of his information. For example in two places (pp. 44 and 95) he flatly ascribes responsibility for the delay in the opening of the 1930 congressional session to the anti-Yrigoyenist opposition which, "hopelessly outnumbered could only boycott sessions in an effort to prevent quorums." No source is given for this assertion which seems dubious on its face (could a hopelessly outnumbered minority prevent a quorum?), and one is left to wonder whether the author read the debates himself or relied on the "facts" as given by a well-known but not always accurate Radical Party author whom Smith lists in his bibliography.

However one may differ with the specifics of his approach, this is an innovative and provocative study that no student of recent Argentine history can ignore. Peter Smith has dared to raise vital questions, and if his methods or his conclusions are not free from challenge, the burden is now on other writers to provide more persuasive interpretations if they can.

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*Uruguay: The Politics of Failure.* By MARTIN WEINSTEIN. Westport, Connecticut, 1975. Greenwood Press. Tables. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xvii, 190. Cloth. \$13.50.

The title of this study, *Uruguay: The Politics of Failure*, indicates an emphasis on recent events. But Martin Weinstein devotes all but thirteen pages to the period before 1960. He does furnish a readable and clear political history of Uruguay from 1904 to the 1960s in the first four of the book's five chapters.

José Batlle y Ordóñez as the president during 1904–1907 and 1911–1915 indeed functioned as the father of modern Uruguay, probably from the 1890s until his death in 1929. His vigorous support of organized labor, stressed in the chapter on "batllismo," does help explain the increasing commitment of successive reform governments to workers' benefits and the most elaborate welfare state ever attempted by a democratic republic in Latin America.

Weinstein maintains a sharp accuracy in his recapitulation of the party political struggles between Colorados and Blancos. But he stops