

ceasing search for the incarnation of the evangelical brotherhood, a society open to the creative ingenuity of man, since it can never be totally realized in time" (p. 111).

*The Overall Development of Chile* is a useful supplement to existing literature on Christian Democracy. We await, however, critical evaluation of the Christian Democrats' progress toward the overall development of Chile.

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*Aníbal Pinto: Historia política de su gobierno.* By CRISTIÁN ZEGERS A. Santiago, 1969. Editorial Universitaria. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. 124. Paper. \$2.80.

As the author, Cristián Zegers, explains in the introduction to this prize-winning study, his purpose is to examine the administration of Chilean President Aníbal Pinto (1876-1881) from a different approach. Too often historians focus their attention on the two major problems of this period: the prolonged economic crisis that gripped the country and the outbreak of the War of the Pacific. Consequently they ignore the important political developments occurring during Pinto's administration, developments that had significant bearing on the political crisis that culminated in the Civil War of 1891.

Zegers attempts to rectify this oversight and succeeds completely. In 1875 Chile was directed by Federico Errázuriz, a strong-willed authoritarian leader who controlled a collection of factions cooperating with his regime. Using his influence, he selected the colorless, innocuous Pinto to be his successor. Errázuriz' cronies ratified the choice and as the government traditionally manipulated the balloting, Pinto's election was assured. The new president was characterized as hard working, not very ambitious politically, a pacifist, Positivist, anti-clerical, and anti-Conservative. An ardent believer in legislation as a means of achieving change, he envisioned an orderly and evolutionary approach to what he called progress.

Pinto ruled a nation split into many political cliques, and his difficulties in assembling acceptable cabinets directly reflected this fact. Politicians eagerly sought presidential favor, and ideology, aside from the Conservative and Radical parties, had little to do with policy decisions. Momentary gain and possession of power were the most important considerations. Pinto generally based his government on the Liberals, hopelessly fragmented, and the Radicals, a small party

with virtually no electoral strength. He roused himself from his usual lethargy only when suggestions were made that Conservatives be brought into the cabinet during the crisis that developed with the War of the Pacific. He adamantly opposed the idea, and a national cabinet came to mean all groups except the Conservatives. As a result, the Conservative party resolved to seek the destruction of presidential omnipotence.

The War of the Pacific brought a multitude of new problems to Pinto: money to purchase armaments, leadership for the armies, defense plans. He relied on a number of able advisers and turned over decision-making to them. It was ironic, according to the author, that a man such as Pinto led Chile during a critical time, for a more unlikely wartime leader was not imaginable.

The politicians, who might be expected to tone down partisan criticism during this period of crisis, continued in their traditional manner to focus attention on divisive domestic reforms, and the first full-scale successful attacks on executive authority date from Pinto's term. Factions in Congress astutely saw that a weak president such as Pinto would hardly offer dynamic leadership in opposing their demands. Pinto avoided conflict and preferred to appease those who wanted to give wider powers to Congress. Cabinets, formerly censured only when major blunders had been made, were now attacked on the slightest pretext, and it became the general rule that cabinet officers had to justify all acts to Congress. Ministers spent most of their time defending their decisions, however minor, to that body. Officials responsible for war preparations were likewise forced to explain their plans to Congress. Pinto could have cut short such developments, but he remained aloof from political squabbling and, as a result, encouraged congressional boldness.

Zegers believes that if the War of the Pacific had not broken out, the political crisis that exploded in 1891 would have developed earlier. Furthermore, the anticlerical laws passed during the following administration of Domingo Santa María would have been enacted by Pinto, for this was one field where he had strong opinions. But Congress only began to study these proposals and divided its attention between the War and domestic matters.

Zegers has masterfully detailed his findings and cited a wide variety of official and personal records, particularly the private papers of Pinto, as supporting evidence for his thesis. He has performed a real service in dissipating the thick fogbank of congressional

verbiage to clarify the political climate during the Pinto regime. For his study Zegers is to be commended.

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*Historia de la marina de Chile.* By CARLOS LÓPEZ URRUTIA. Foreword by GUILLERMO FELIÚ CRUZ. Santiago, 1969. Editorial Andrés Bello. Illustrations. Notes. Bibliography. Pp. 446. Paper. \$7.00. (Distributed in U. S. by Ediciones de la Frontera, Hollywood, California.)

This is a work by an author in love with his subject. It is far from routine Latin American institutional military history, much of which is dull recounting of wars, battles, units, personnel, and the like. The book is well written, thoroughly documented with published and unpublished sources, and correctly organized and balanced as to periods of institutional development. The serious reader need not rely on the praise accorded it by Guillermo Feliú Cruz at the end of his foreword in order to arrive at this conclusion.

The Chilean navy was historically significant throughout the national period. Naval power played a prime role in securing independence, in maintaining Chile's dominant position on the Pacific coast at the expense of Peru and Bolivia, and in providing for the defense of Chile's far-flung frontiers to the north and south. At times the focus on these points is unclear, however, doubtless because of the author's dedication to institutional affairs.

Politically the navy has been a force to be reckoned with. The navy provided armed strength and logistical support in the civil war of 1891, which dramatically altered the nation's political evolution. The navy also figured prominently in the troubled years of the mid-1920s when military men intervened in politics and government. Sadly, the place of the navy in the 1891 crisis is inadequately explained; it is as if an explanation were purposely avoided. Its role in the civil-military conflict of 1924-1927 is treated in cursory fashion. But curiously the Potemkin-style mutiny of 1931 receives an excellent, though "official" treatment. One wonders why López chose not to examine the extraprofessional activities of naval officers in those earlier periods, and why he eschews interpretive material on relationship of the navy with the Valparaíso oligarchy and its importance. To be sure his purposes are his own, but they limit the potential readers of the book.

There are occasional gaffes such as citing of Armando Donoso as