

Dr. Inman was well known as a proponent of inter-American cooperation. He was a self-confessed "devotee of Pan Americanism," a believer in the "spiritual unity of the Americas," and "a lover of peace." He attended unofficially almost all of the inter-American conferences since the Fifth Conference at Santiago, Chile in 1923. Because of Dr. Inman's presence at so many of these meetings his interesting and intimate observations of conference actions and personalities lend a special value to this volume. At best however, none of his descriptions of individual conferences or meetings of foreign ministers can be regarded as fully adequate either in detail or in significance. Apparently he did not intend to write an exhaustive history of the conferences but rather an appraisal of inter-Americanism from the perspective of a long and active identification with the movement.

This work bears the mark of the propagandist and his idealism. Since the publication of his *Intervention in Mexico* in 1919 Dr. Inman was an ardent advocate of nonintervention as any Latin disciple of Carlos Calvo. Concerning Cordell Hull's acceptance of the non-intervention pledge at the Montevideo Conference in 1933, Dr. Inman wrote: "It was . . . one of the greatest moments in the life of the writer who had struggled for a decade to bring about such a change" (p. 157). Thereafter he regarded the principle of nonintervention as the keystone of the arch of inter-American cooperation.

Believing that the United States had abandoned the Good Neighbor Policy after the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Dr. Inman was particularly concerned that American economic assistance to Latin America was too niggardly. He insisted as much as the Latins that vastly increased aid was essential for survival of the "spiritual unity" of the Americas.

Naturally he welcomed the Alliance for Progress as the kind of inter-American economic cooperation for which he had sought. Its advent tempered an element of pessimism which was creeping into his views on inter-American relations in the decade following the Caracas Conference.

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American Support of Free Elections Abroad. By THEODORE PAUL WRIGHT, JR. Washington, D. C., 1964. Public Affairs Press. Pp. 178.

This work critically evaluates two important, interrelated facets of American foreign policy in the twentieth century. It is conceptually concerned with the hypothesis propounded by such scholars as Hans

Morganthau that the United States has been the harbinger of “nationalistic universalism” in an aspect of its policy of Manifest Destiny. In its empirical approach the book carefully and deftly analyzes the attempts of the United States to alter effectively the course of developments in other countries by fostering and utilizing the technique of free elections.

It has been widely asserted that the direction and persuasion of American foreign policy has been given impetus by its ideological insistence upon free elections as the most valid expression of popular will and of democratic ideals. Professor Wright takes umbrage with this approach, declaring that “The United States has not deliberately embarked upon a policy of promoting democracy in other countries,” but has supported free elections “as an answer to certain concrete policy problems which accompanied its rise to world power.” Wright adds further that “The chief of these [problems] has been how to prevent or halt revolutions. In practically every case related in this study, political stability was the direct or indirect goal of American electoral intervention” (p. 137).

To support his thesis, Professor Wright divides his study in two parts. The first two-thirds of the work are devoted to Latin American policy. Eight case studies serve as examples of American electoral intervention from 1898-1933: Cuba, Panama, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Costa Rica, and Honduras. It is Wright’s contention that although these were relatively “minor affairs” they must be regarded “as precedents for policies of much wider relevancy” (p. 2). The studies are illuminating indeed. Fundamental to all the cases has been the overriding desire to maintain political stability. Why? Primarily because “conditions of unrest and civil war may provoke or legally excuse intrusion by foreign powers hostile to us” (p. 137).

With these studies as a backdrop Wright proceeds to appraise the United States policy of free elections in East European and Southeast Asian countries since World War II. The success of this policy has been extremely limited. Ambiguities and contradictions have in some instances rendered the policy absurd. Is an election “free” if the United States directs and controls its mechanisms? To what extent can the political structure of another country accommodate “free elections”? In one recent example in South Vietnam, fearing that Premier Ngo Dinh Diem would lose, the United States blocked a free election as directed in the Geneva Conference directives of 1955; yet

as late as early 1966 American spokesmen continue to call for free elections in that country.

As Professor Wright has noted in this excellent study, the policy of support of free elections has not served American foreign interests. A reexamination of its value in foreign affairs would appear to be in order.

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Wilson: Confusions and Crises, 1915-1916. By ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton, N. J., 1964. Princeton University Press. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 386. \$8.50.

Wilson: Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace, 1916-1917. By ARTHUR S. LINK. Princeton, N.J., 1965. Princeton University Press. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xiv, 464. \$8.50.

Volumes IV and V of Arthur S. Link's monumental biography of Woodrow Wilson deal primarily with America's entry into World War I, and Latin American affairs play a much less important role than in volumes II and III. Indeed, since Link foresightedly disposed of the whole Haitian intervention in volume III, these later installments deal only with Mexico: two chapters on Villa's raid into Columbus, New Mexico, and the Pershing punitive expedition in *Confusions and Crises* and a few scattered pages in *Campaigns for Progressivism and Peace*. Wherever Mexico appears, it interrupts what the reader cannot help regarding as the more important course of European affairs and thus probably reflects Wilson's recurring irritation at having to haggle with Carranza and chase Villa when he would much rather be restoring peace to Europe and thus keeping the United States out of the War.

Now that Professor Link has reached the milestone of April 1917 in American-European relations and disposed of all but the final details of Wilson's Latin American policy, perhaps it would be appropriate to strike a balance concerning the four volumes of his biography which deal with Wilson's first presidential term. As the work proceeds, it becomes less and less a conventional biography, for Wilson as a person recedes into the background and often entirely disappears for pages at a time. His private life is developed in separate, intrusive chapters such as the one in volume IV dealing with his courtship and second marriage. Here Mrs. Galt breaks the flow of *grosse Politik* as much as Pancho Villa. Link has sometimes failed to suggest how Wilson's personal trials could have influenced his public actions,