

while at the same time it must promote industrial development and protect American financial interests.

Professor Tannenbaum rightly stresses the need for developing the political aspects of the Alliance for Progress. He underscores the importance of bringing the democratic political parties into the Alliance concept.

In conclusion, the author puts forth persuasively a policy proposal. Starting with the assertion that the real question faced by the United States is how to allow, and even promote, the necessary social revolution without interrupting the flow of foreign investments required for Latin American industrial development, he goes on to suggest that political measures are needed to sustain social reform and to protect the foreign investor at the same time. His proposal is twofold. The first part would consist of a policy of placing a temporary repayment tax on all imports from the country or countries involved in confiscation of foreign investments, and using funds thus derived to pay for the confiscated property. The second part of the proposal suggests a broad program of support of Latin American efforts to improve social and economic conditions, including encouragement of private investment and other forms of aid. These may not be especially viable ideas, but they are expounded with the cogency and insight one has come to expect of Professor Tannenbaum from his earlier studies of Latin American problems. In short, this volume as a whole is a solid background review of contemporary Latin America which combines knowledge and eloquence.

University of North Carolina

FEDERICO G. GIL

*The Organization of American States and the Hemisphere Crisis.* By JOHN C. DREIER. New York, 1962. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Row, Publishers. Index. Pp. xii, 147. \$2.95.

This is a chrome-plated résumé of the Organization of American States (OAS) from 1888-1889 as the Pan American Union (to promote trade) to Punta del Este Conference II (1962) to promote U. S. Cold War policies and expel Cuba. Mr. Dreier feels that the conference did not go far enough in breaking down non-intervention safeguards. He fails to disclose the lavish use of U. S. propaganda, dollars, and economic pressures before and during the conference.

The countries with most territory and population abstained, though this was partly rectified (not mentioned in the book) by a quickie loan to Frondizi whose sudden policy shift led to military

dictatorship. Mexico's leading news magazine *Política* headlined the conference as RED-FACEDNESS, MUDDY WATERS AND DOUBLE-DEALING. Leading jurists considered Cuba's exclusion a violation of the OAS charter, a mutilation. Even Conservatives shrugged it off as a bald sell-out.

This is another coals-to-Newcastle volume reendorsing Washington cold-war policies—iceberg polish rather than underwater perils. True there is a statement about “the impact of social revolution,” and the book is on a loftier plane than the previous volume in the Council's “policy” series, viz Adolf A. Berle's *Latin America—Diplomacy and Reality*, with its newspaper clichés, molasses sweetening, and basement gurglings of the militant Christian anti-Communist crusade.

This is a marvelous, too marvelous condensation. It would have been strengthened had the basic documents from the Monroe Doctrine down to the Alliance for Progress been presented with less thesis-making emasculation so the uninformed reader could evaluate the author's proposals. The OAS cannot survive as merely alphabet soup or as a Cold War chess problem.

The important controversies are avoided: foreign investment, trade, diversification, industrialization, quotas, price-fixing, inflations, cultural and ethnic conflicts, religion, population pressures, living standards, unemployment. Latin America will not be “saved” from Communism by any Holy Alliance of handouts to feudal dictatorships and starving peoples—a status merely strengthened by our charity well-fare program—as Ché Guevara vulgarly expressed it at Punta del Este—“more outhouses rather than factories.” As a cartoon has pictured it: little frightened men with bulging pockets watering little flower-pots labeled “reform and freedom.”

Mr. Dreier was a top OAS official at the time of the U.S.-C.I.A. promoted invasion of Guatemala in 1954. OAS failure to act remains one of the more shameful blots on the organization. Mr. Dreier's Red-tinted phraseology about that affair cannot survive even casual reading of the State Department's own White Paper, though it tagged all Guatemalan school teachers as Communist suspects because they were intellectuals. Any valid knowledge of present OAS, State Department, C.I.A. (not mentioned), and Pentagon (not mentioned) policies *must* rest on a knowledge of the Guatemalan aggression, the beginning of the corruption of the OAS and pattern for our lugubrious follies in handling Cuba. No sensible or truthful examination is provided here. The only documented study, aside from books by Guatemalan leaders, is Gregorio Selser's *El Guatemalazo*:

*La primera guerra sucia* (Ediciones Iguazú, 1961.)—unlikely ever to be available to the American public who would not buy it anyway.

Beginning with the 1954 Caracas Resolution and through San José and two Punta del Este conferences, the OAS has been steadily reconverted into an office of U.S. colonial administration. Mr. Dreier, in the name of the Cold War Communist menace, proposes to complete this ruinous process of "collaboration." President Kennedy and lower echelons have warned that unless the southern countries accept our policies, we shall go ahead unilaterally in violation of international agreement.

Remarks Mr. Dreier, "If it [the United States] ever has to fall back on unilateral action, taken without the consent or the will of Latin American peoples, it may gain momentary security at the price of lasting security." Amen, and amen again! But except for freedom catchwords and forced acceptance of *fait accompli*, what else, pray tell, is our policy?

Deep River, Connecticut

CARLETON BEALS

*Latin America. The Eleventh Hour.* By GARY MACEOIN. New York, 1962. P. J. Kenedy and Sons. Index. Pp. 224. \$4.50.

The author of this volume, a Roman Catholic journalist, presents the Roman Catholic view of current developments and conditions in Latin America, along with occasional illusions to historical background. It consists of a brief foreword, nine chapters, a rather pessimistic five-page conclusion, and an appendix which includes "some statistics" on each of the twenty independent nations composing the region. These are the chapter headings: Latin America in Eruption; The Have-Nots; New Wine in Old Bottles; Successful Social Revolution—Mexico; Abortive Social Revolution—Bolivia; Perverted Social Revolution—Cuba; Foreign Capital Primes the Pump; Religion's Prime Role; Leadership from Within.

The first two chapters, based mainly on personal observations, deal with oppression, poverty, frustration, discontent, and insurgency; the third, with attempts at reform and the broad aspects of social change. The chapter on Mexico's social revolution attempts to set forth its merits and shortcomings as the author sees them. His discussion of Bolivia's revolution, as the chapter's title suggests, is diffused with doubt in respect to its achievements and its future. His survey of the revolution in Cuba reveals that Roman Catholics, like many others, misjudged Fidel Castro—and the author, like many others, tries to exculpate the false prophets by blaming public offi-